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Abstract
Corruption has a complex relationship with economic growth. We have explored the impact of corruption on credit 
risk from a global perspective. The sample consists of 178 countries and covers 18 years that range from 2000 to 
2017. Non-performing loan (NPL) is used as a proxy for credit risk and data regarding NPL is collected from the World 
Bank Database. Corruption scores are collected from the Transparency International reports. Panel regression results 
provide a positive association between corruption and credit risk for the global sample. Generalized Methods of 
Moments regression and robustness tests validate the fndings. However, sub-sample analysis provides support for 
“grease the wheel” hypothesis for high corruption countries and indicates that corruption is benefcial in a weak 
form of governance and excessive regulatory pressure. This study advocate for the importance of strong governance 
mechanisms in high corruption countries that can minimize the impact of corruption on banking sector proftability 
and ensure economic development. Unlike past literature, we provide global evidence on the association between 
corruption and credit risk for the banking sector which allows generalizability. 
Keywords: Corruption, Credit risk, Banks, Bureaucracy, Corporate fnance and governance 
JEL Classifcations: D73, G21 
Introduction 
Corruption has been an important issue for social sci-
entists as it causes social and economic problems in the 
society. Te government makes laws to curtail corruption 
and these law-making procedure and implementation 
resulted in accounting cost. Such an efort requires fruit-
ful results in the form of socioeconomic proft. Transpar-
ency International [46] defnes corruption as “the abuse 
of entrusted power for private gain”. Corruption can be 
classifed into two categories. One is “petty corruption” 
that is referred to the low and mid-level public to abuse 
their power and another is “grand corruption” that is 
referred to the institution. Tese institutions could be 
private or government institutions. Khalil et al. [33] cat-
egories corruption into two broad categories of “bribery 
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and extortion”. Te bribery is considered to play its role 
by cooperation, while extortion is benefting one party 
to the detriment of another. In net, extortion is a zero-
sum game, while in bribery total is more than the sum of 
individuals, which means both participants gain and their 
total utility increases. Corruption plays its part in allow-
ing benefcial transactions, in the form of bribery, which 
could have a diverse impact on economic growth [44].
It misallocates the reward among the stakeholders, and 
some stakeholders gain more, who deserve less, than the 
others, who deserve the more. Corruption is one of the 
obstacles in developing countries that hinder the pace of 
improving the life quality of citizens [45].
Tere are two schools of that perceive corruption to 
serve as a “grease or sand” for economic development. 
While Mauro [36] began the debate by producing a nega-
tive association between corruption and economic devel-
opment, such a relationship has been confrmed by the 
latest studies [44]. However, empirical evidence on the 
positive association between corruption and economic 
© The Author(s) 2021. This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and
the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material
in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material
is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the
permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativeco
mmons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. 














development has also emerged. For example, Huang [30]
fnd a signifcant positive impact of corruption on eco-
nomic development in the Asia-Pacifc region. Corrup-
tion and economic development studies have evolved and 
recent studies have shifted toward exploring the impact 
of corruption on fnancial development. Financial devel-
opment has proven to be a decisive factor in economic 
development [44]. Bolarinwa and Soetan [12] provide 
mixed fndings on the impact of corruption on bank prof-
itability for emerging markets while confrming a positive 
impact on the developed countries.
A well-defned and efcient fnancial system enables
the economy to gain maximum utility for its stakehold-
ers. In terms of fnancial economics, the resources move
from the market where marginal reward or utility is rela-
tively less to the market where marginal reward or util-
ity is more. So, the fnancial system aims to circulate the
fnancial resources in an efcient and frictionless manner.
An important feature of the fnancial institution especially
the banking sector is the issuance of the loan. Bank loan
serves as a major source of frm fnancing. However, banks
could sufer from a higher degree of agency problem in the
presence of corruption, which could increase bad loans [2].
Tus, corruption creates a toxic environment in the bank-
ing sector that allows the loan ofcer to extract private
benefts from loan contracts at the expense of the stake-
holders (more specifcally the depositors). Uddin et al. [47]
exerts the importance of the absence of corruption for
long –term stability of the fnancial sectors and provides
empirical evidence that control of corruption reduces bank
risk-taking behaviors and improves stability.
Te bank lending corruption has been explored by the 
degree of non-performing loan (NPL) in recent stud-
ies (please see Bahoo [6]). A non-performing loan is the 
amount of money upon which debtor cannot pay interest 
according to schedule. Te nonpayment amount would 
be interested payment, principal amount or both. Gener-
ally, the delay in scheduled payment more than 90 days 
is considered as a non-performing loan. Te reason for a 
non-performing loan may be diferent. Some may be sys-
tematic i.e. related to the overall economy and some may 
be frm-specifc. Nepotism, political infuence and brib-
ery are some important causes of issuing non-perform-
ing loan by banks. Developing countries, where fnancial 
institutions are not well developed and the rate of bribery 
is high, usually, face such problems in large extent. Abu-
zayed et al. [1] fnd that corruption increase bank lending 
but reduces its proft potential for both developed and 
developing countries. Bank operating in highly corrupt 
environment engage in income smoothing exercise to 
smooth their positive earnings [41]. Such fndings require 
further exploration of the association between corrup-
tion and credit risk for the banking sector. 
Terefore, we aim to provide global evidence on the 
impact of corruption on bank credit risk. Tis paper 
is divided into fve sections. Te “Introduction” sec-
tion provides the rationale of the study by outlining the 
research problem. In the “Literature review and hypoth-
esis development” section, we have focused on the exten-
sive review of the literature to identify gaps in the existing 
literature in the context of corruption and credit risk of 
the banking sector. Review of the past literature provides 
an opportunity for this study to develop a hypothesis. 
Te “Methodology” section of the paper deals with data 
description and empirical model for statistical analysis. 
Results obtained through the analysis of empirical mod-
els are discussed in the “Results and discussion” section. 
Finally, we provide a conclusion, policy recommenda-
tion and suggestions for future research in “Conclusion” 
section. 
Literature review and hypothesis development 
Corruption has been an important grey area for social 
scientists, especially in the aspect of politics and eco-
nomics [53]. It is very technical to defne corruption as 
the defnition of corruption may vary from space to space 
and time to time. Some countries may defne an act as a 
crime, while another could consider it an ethical problem 
or rent-seeking, and someone may consider it a part of 
game theory. So diferent studies analyze it in a diferent 
aspect and conclude diferent results under the typical 
defnition. Tabish and Jha [45] analyze the relationship 
between corruption-free indicators, standard proce-
dures and fair punishment. Te study concludes that fair 
punishment resulted in a decrease in corruption. Jus-
tice without discretion is one of the infuential elements 
that cause a decrease in corruption in a society. Ethical 
values play a vital role to keep an individual aloof from 
corruption.
Diferent sectors have a diferent propensity of corrup-
tion. Mauro [37, 38] argues that there is more corrup-
tion in public investment sector like infrastructure and 
capital-intensive investment than health and education 
sector. Te infrastructure sector and military expenditure 
have more rent-seeking element than the health and edu-
cation sector. So, the structure of fnancial institutions 
especially the banking sector is important in analyz-
ing the misallocation of NPL and the relationship of the 
administrative structure of these institutions with cor-
ruption. Bougatef [14] analyzes the soundness of Islamic 
banks and concludes that there is a signifcant relation-
ship between corruption and NPL. Financial sector of 
the economy makes it sure that fnancial resources are 
fowing efciently in the fnancial system and the local 
and foreign investors are satisfed from fnancial insti-
tutions. Te corruption in fnancial institutions shake 
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the confdence level of the foreign investor and this has 
disaster impact especially on the developing economies 
as the non-performing loan would become a major ele-
ment of gambling. Several factors lead to the growth or 
decline of the nonperforming loans, such as macroeco-
nomic variables and bank-specifc variables, banks own-
ership structure, corruption and information sharing. 
Among them, one of the main factors that afect the non-
performing loans is corruption. In developing countries, 
corruption plays a very important role in the growth of 
non-performing loans. Damanhur et al. [19] analyze the 
efect of micro and macro variables on non-performing 
fnancing by using panel data approach for 13 banks, con-
sisting of 2014–2015 semiannual data. Te results show 
the infation and gross domestic product greatly afect 
non-performing fnancing indirectly. Tese macro vari-
ables change the prevailing sentiments in the market, and 
this ultimately changes the associated risk factors of NPL 
and in the result of this risk factor banks change the ratio 
of NPL accordingly.
Macro variables also have an impact on NPL. Umar 
[48] analyzes the Chinese banks and concludes that 
macro variables have a signifcant impact on the NPL 
of banks in case of China. Moral hazard has been an 
important topic in social economics. Corruption afects 
the performance of banks as banks misallocate the loan 
due to nepotism. Bougatef [15] concludes that there is a 
positive relationship between corruption and NPL. USA 
banks play an important role in the world economy, as 
these banks and stock markets are the major infuen-
tial actors of the international fnancial system. Ghosh 
[28] shows that distressed banks having high NPL are 
major obstacles to obtain a sound fnancial system in the 
USA. Tese banks are a major cause to shake the conf-
dence level of bank customers and in result, these banks 
become defaulter in recession. 
Government structure plays a vital role to determine 
the level of corruption and non-performing loan. Fan 
et  al. [25] studies the China fnancial system and con-
clude that government ofcers and bureaucrats are major 
actors for an excess portion of the non-performing loan 
in the fnancial banking system, as China is a communist 
country where most of the institutions are under the con-
trol of the state. Geletta [26] concludes that weak gov-
ernment institutions and weak credit policy assessment 
are the major cause of non-performing loan in Ethiopia. 
Te similar conclusion is by Richard [43] who analyzes 
that weak analyses of credit policy and misallocation of 
resources are the major cause of non-performing loans. 
Tis could be analyzed in the aspect of moral hazard as 
moral hazard cause misallocation of resources. Dass et al. 
[20] provide evidence that public corruption in the USA 
results in lower frm value and increased information 
asymmetry. Brown et al. [17] further validated the nega-
tive impact of corruption on frm value.
Atkins et al. [5] use loan loss provision and analyze the 
relationship of corruption to non-performing loan and 
concludes that there is a positive relationship between 
corruption and loan loss provision. It means that ear-
lier the bank recollects its debt, the lesser is the portion 
of the non-performing loan in bank fnancial statement. 
Te other conclusion is that the deposit insurance 
scheme and government ownership in the banking sys-
tem also afect the portion of the nonperforming loan. 
Tese insurance schemes and ownership of government 
increase the portion of the non-performing loan in the 
system and this corruption ultimately leads to inefcient 
allocation of fnancial resources. 
Barth et al. [7] analyze the impact of information fow 
among fnancial institutions and fnds that information 
sharing among fnancial institutions and banking sys-
tem decrease the portion of non-performing loan. Boud-
riga et al. [13] concluded that an efective way to reduce 
the non-performing loan portion in the bank statement. 
Te above literature study encompasses the NPL and 
corruption relationship by using a panel data approach. 
No study uses the corruption perception index, NPL 
and interest rate or interest rate spread simultaneously 
to analyze the relationship. Te incorporation of inter-
est rate spread would give a better result, as interest rate 
spread is the major element in determining the NPL. 
H1 Ceteris Paribus, Countries with a high level of cor-
ruption have a higher level of credit risk. 
Methodology 
Data 
Te study uses the corruption and credit risk (non-per-
forming loan is used as a proxy) data of 178 countries 
across various regions, extracted from the World Bank 
database. Te data ranges from the year 2000 to 2017, i.e. 
18 years. Following Umar and Sun [48], we have selected 
the period due to the positive relationship between the 
non-performing loan and GDP growth. Unlike Umar 
and Sun [48], our study focused on country-level data 
and reports on the most recent available data. In a simi-
lar study, Bougatef [16] only reports fndings based on a 
sample of 22 countries over the period 2008–2012. Out 
study thus overcomes the limitations of past studies 
with a superior sample and contributes to the generaliz-
ability of past fndings exploring an association between 
corruption and credit risk. Data regarding macroeco-
nomic variables are collected from the World Bank data-
base, International Monetary Fund (IMF) Database and 
reports published by Transparency International. Te 






data source for each variable is further highlighted in 
Table 4. 
Variable defnition and model development 
Bank non-performing loans (NPL) to total gross loans 
are the dependent variable of the study. We have used the 
ratio to analyze the impact of corruption of the sound-
ness of the banking system in the world. A higher value of 
the ratio means higher credit risk, and vice versa. Table 1
provides the NPL statistics by region over the period 
of 18  years spanning from 2000 to 2017 along with the 
average NPL score by region and year. Te NPL data was 
collected from the World Bank database. We witness a 
decreasing trend in global NPL (from 14.02 to 3.44) until 
2008. However, global NPL has increased since the global 
fnancial crisis in 2008. 
Among the seven economic regions presented in 
Table  1, Europe has the highest NPL ratio followed by 
South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. North American 
region has the lowest NPL ratio. More specifcally, we 
fnd that the NPL score varies between various Asian 
regions. NPL score is higher in South Asia as com-
pared to East Asia. Islam and Nishiyama [31] conclude 
Table 1 Non-performing loan statistics 
that South Asian countries (the study explore Bangla-
desh, India, Nepal and Pakistan) sufer from credit risk 
due to poor governance which results in moral hazard 
problems. Zha et al. [51] exert a strong credit risk inter-
dependence among East Asian countries. However, we 
fnd limited comparative evidence on credit risk between 
South and East Asian countries which constitutes a major 
gap in the credit risk literature. Europe and Central Asia 
have shown signifcant improvement in credit risk man-
agement by reducing the NPL ratio from 21.22 in 2000 to 
8.76, a 58.72% decrease in 18 years. While we see a slight 
increase on NPL in Europe since 2013, the score has been 
decreasing since the publication of the credit risk man-
agement guidelines by the Basel Committee in 2015. Tis 
variation of NPL across regions has made the determi-
nants of NPL an interesting topic of research [48]. Dimi-
trios et  al. [21] confrm that country-specifc factors 
contribute to the increase in NPL. 
We have used Corruption as an explanatory variable in
this study. Corruption Perception Index (CPI) published
by Transparency International is used as a measure of cor-
ruption level for the sample. CPI scores for 2017 are pro-
vided in Table 2. Somalia has ranked 1 with a CPI score of
Year Region 
East Asia and Europe Latin America and The Middle East and North America South Asia Sub-Saharan Average 
Pacifc Caribbean North Africa Africa NPL by 
year 
2000 6.83 21.22 – – – – – 14.02 
2001 8.00 17.91 1.62 – – – – 9.18 
2002 6.59 11.02 6.35 – – – – 7.57 
2003 4.66 8.39 5.57 – – – – 6.05 
2004 4.23 6.07 4.20 – – – – 4.67 
2005 5.24 9.25 3.66 8.21 0.50 8.98 7.35 6.07 
2006 5.04 7.32 2.79 6.47 0.40 7.30 9.91 5.41 
2007 4.87 5.36 2.42 5.31 0.40 7.44 7.29 4.45 
2008 2.52 3.25 2.68 6.59 0.80 5.79 6.98 3.44 
2009 3.23 6.94 3.51 7.70 3.13 9.49 9.84 5.89 
2010 2.87 7.68 2.95 7.33 2.79 18.06 8.21 6.26 
2011 2.57 8.57 2.67 5.68 2.31 6.19 6.65 5.65 
2012 3.11 9.34 2.57 6.30 1.98 8.93 6.91 6.13 
2013 3.20 10.54 2.36 6.58 1.51 8.66 8.57 6.71 
2014 2.76 10.48 2.35 6.55 1.18 8.89 8.48 6.63 
2015 2.60 10.30 2.38 6.45 0.99 8.80 9.14 6.72 
2016 2.75 9.31 2.49 6.82 0.96 7.49 10.62 6.71 
2017 2.86 8.76 2.74 6.74 0.79 7.67 11.31 6.69 
Average NPL 4.11 9.53 3.14 6.67 1.36 8.74 8.55 6.57 
by region 
Bank nonperforming loans to total gross loans are the value of nonperforming loans divided by the total value of the loan portfolio (including nonperforming loans 
before the deduction of specifc loan-loss provisions). The loan amount recorded as nonperforming should be the gross value of the loan as recorded on the balance 
sheet, not just the overdue amount 











































  Table 2 Corruption score of selected countries 
Country CPI Score 2017 Rank 
Low level of corruption 
New Zealand 89 180 
Denmark 88 179 
Finland 85 176 
Norway 85 176 
Switzerland 85 176 
Singapore 84 174 
Sweden 84 174 
Canada 82 170 
Luxembourg 82 170 
Netherlands 82 170 
United Kingdom 82 170 
Germany 81 169 
Australia 77 166 
Hong Kong 77 166 
Iceland 77 166 
High level of corruption 
Eritrea 20 15 
Angola 19 13 
Turkmenistan 19 13 
Iraq 18 11 
Venezuela 18 11 
Korea, North 17 7 
Equatorial Guinea 17 7 
Guinea Bissau 17 7 
Libya 17 7 
Sudan 16 5 
Yemen 16 5 
Afghanistan 15 4 
Syria 14 3 
South Sudan 12 2 
Somalia 9 1 
9. A low score in the CPI index indicates that citizens of the
country are not satisfed by the measures taken by the gov-
ernment to tackle corruption in the country and vice versa.
Until 2011, CPI scores ranged from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10
(very clean). However, the scale has been revised and since
2012 the CPI scores range from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100
(very clean). Terefore, we have adjusted while calculating
CPI scores following [42]. We defne the corruption index
(CI) as follows: 
CI = 10 − CPI for the period 2000−2011 and 
CPI 
CI = 10 − for the period 2012 − 2017 
10 
Tis revised measure allows us to incorporate a
higher level of corruption with high CI score. Table  3
provides a mean CI score of 6.36, which indicates that
corruption represents a serious concern for the major-
ity of the countries. Te average CI score ranges from
a low 2.003 (North America) to high 7.547 (Sub-Saha-
ran Africa). While a small number of past studies have
explored the impact of corruption on credit risk [13, 
42], a straightforward relation between corruption and
credit risk has yet to be established.
Despite the diference [16, 42] in the fndings of past
studies, we emphasize the fndings of Boudriga et  al.
[13] that a better corruption control can play a greater
role in reducing NPL. NPL can distort the allocation of
funds through the banking sector which is more likely
to happen in a highly corrupt country [15]. Table  5
reports a negative correlation between corruption and
credit risk which is further investigated with panel
regression analysis.
Past studies on NPL literature have emphasized the
importance of macroeconomic factors. Economic
development is reported as a signifcant negative deter-
minant of NPL by Ali and Daly [3] and was later con-
frmed by Park [42]. Te correlation matrix provided
in Table  5 indicates a negative link between corrup-
tion and economic growth (measured by GDP Growth)
which highlights the fact that corruption serves as a
great obstacle for the economic development of a coun-
try. Unemployment is associated with NPL by Bougatef
[15] as an unemployed person become unable to repay
debts which increase the non-performing loans. An
increase in the capital-to-asset ratio can reduce risk-
taking behavior in the banking sector [52]. Bougatef
[15] emphasizes on the importance of capital informa-
tion disclosure quality that can be utilized by public
and private credit registries to reduce credit risk.
Following the fndings of Ghosh [27], we have
included infation as control as infation increase the
nominal interest rates and increase the chances of a
default. Excessive defcit spending leads to the sover-
eign debt crisis, which may end up in banking sector
turmoil [48]. Trade openness decreases corruption and
thus, has the capabilities of reducing credit risk [24]. 
Remittances can provide alternative income streams
to meet fnancial obligations and hence have a negative
impact on NPL [34].
Terefore, we have included capitalization, credit dis-
closure, economic growth, infation, public debt, remit-
tance, trade openness and unemployment as control
variables in this study. We attempt to investigate the
causal link between corruption and credit risk using
the following model that uses balanced panel data with
3204 observations: 
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  Table 3 CI scores across regions 
Year Region 
East Asia and Europe and Latin America and The Middle East and North America South Asia Sub-
Pacifc Central Asia Caribbean North Africa Saharan 
Africa 
2000 7.136 5.718 8.227 8.790 1.500 8.400 8.883 
2001 7.027 5.827 7.767 8.930 1.750 9.325 8.994 
2002 7.014 5.635 7.587 8.815 1.650 8.725 8.798 
2003 6.845 5.192 7.490 6.250 1.900 8.750 8.551 
2004 6.655 5.137 7.103 6.010 2.000 8.413 8.119 
2005 6.341 5.014 7.057 5.900 2.000 8.138 7.743 
2006 6.250 4.996 6.853 6.020 2.100 7.613 7.611 
2007 6.077 4.902 6.307 6.170 2.050 7.038 7.255 
2008 6.086 4.924 6.357 6.075 2.000 7.075 7.264 
2009 5.818 4.941 6.370 6.115 1.900 7.200 7.240 
2010 5.773 4.933 6.253 6.010 2.000 7.150 7.221 
2011 5.700 4.946 6.224 6.079 2.096 7.067 7.149 
2012 5.882 4.727 5.870 5.935 2.150 7.163 6.753 
2013 5.845 4.720 5.933 6.080 2.300 7.125 6.811 
2014 6.109 4.647 5.873 5.985 2.250 7.050 6.819 
2015 6.118 4.571 7.037 5.925 2.050 7.088 6.843 
2016 5.564 4.582 5.817 6.200 2.200 6.513 6.981 
2017 5.323 4.580 5.810 6.155 2.150 6.450 6.813 
Grand Total 6.198 4.999 6.663 6.525 2.003 7.571 7.547 
i ˜
Credit Riskit = ˜0 + ˜1Corruptionit + ˜2Controlsit + ° it 
i=1 
(1) 
where i and t subscripts indicate country and year, 
respectively. Credit risk is measured with non-per-
forming loans which are regressed with corruption as 
explanatory variables. A detailed description of controls 
is provided earlier and more information are provided in 
Table 4. 
Corruption and fnancial or economic development 
studies have been afected by heterogeneity bias and 
require to control for the time-specifc efects inherent 
among cross-sectional and time-series units. Failure to 
detect and control such efects could result in inconsist-
ent parameter estimates. One of the solutions is to use 
either fxed or random efect panel regression. Following 
Bitterhout and Simo-Kengne [10], we apply the Hausman 
test to determine between the two types of panel estima-
tors for the current study (Table 5).
Unlike past studies, we take several steps to control 
from endogeneity issues evident in our empirical model 
to ensure limited bias in our study fndings. Endogene-
ity issues could afect the empirical model in three dif-
ferent ways. First, we have considered the problem of 
simultaneity which is also referred to as reverse causality 
in the current corruption and credit risk relationship. 
Bitterhout and Simo-Kengne [10] confrm the exist-
ence of reverse causality in corruption studies due to the 
presence of random shocks that could lead the fnancial 
development to afect corruption.
Omitted variable bias is the second and a common 
source of endogeneity in panel data models [35]. Other 
variables could be used to explain credit risk and cor-
ruption. While non-performing loan remains one of the 
most common measures of credit risk in past studies 
[11, 49], we also fnd new measures of credit risks have 
emerged in recent studies. For example, Hassan et  al. 
[29] measure credit risk by dividing the loan change of
and loan recoveries by last year allowance for non-per-
forming loans. Similarly, bribery has been introduced 
as a measure of corruption by Nur-tegin and Jakee [40].
However, in an attempt to provide global evidence on 
the causal nexus between corruption and credit risk, we 
relied primarily on the data available in the World Bank 
database. Terefore, our model may not be able to meas-
ure credit risk and corruption with available proxies that 
have been adopted by researchers in past studies.
Te fnal issue that could lead to an endogeneity bias 
is measurement error. Te most common measurement 
errors occur due to the use of survey data [10]. In our 
study, we use the corruption perception score (CPI) score 





   
 
Table 4 Descriptive statistics 
Variables Description Source Reference Mean SD Max Min 
Credit Risk Bank non-performing loans to total 
gross loans 
Corruption Corruption perception index (CPI) is 
used as a measure of a country’s 
corruption level 
Capitalization Bank capital to assets measures the 
ratio of bank capital and reserves 
to the total asset 
Credit Disclosure Index The index varies from 0 to 8. The 
higher the value, the more credit-
related information is available 
and reliable 
GDP Growth Annual growth of the real gross 
domestic product 
Infation Consumer price index refects the 
annual percentage change in the 
cost to the average consumer of 
acquiring a basket of goods and 
services 
Public Debt Debt is the entire stock of direct 
government fxed-term contrac-
tual obligations to other outstand-
ing on a particular date 
Remittance Personal remittances comprise per-
sonal transfers and compensations 
of employees 
Trade Openness The sum of total exports of imports 
of goods and services as a share 
of GDP 
Unemployment The share of the labour force that is 
without work but available for and 
seeking employment 
World Bank Database Damanhur et al. [19] 
Transparency International Bougatef [15] 
World Bank Database Bougatef [15] 
World Bank Database Ben Saada [9] 
World Bank Database Damanhur et al. [19] 
IMF Database Damanhur et al. [19] 
World Bank Database Umar and Sun [48] 
World Bank Database Kumar et al. [34] 
World Bank Database Dreher and Siemers [24] 
World Bank Database Kumar et al. [34] 
2.40 5.30 59.76 0.00 
6.36 2.44 10.00 0.00 
4.08 5.58 30.71 0.00 
1.26 2.54 8.00 0.00 
3.95 6.02 123.14 −62.08 
4.40 5.16 48.70 −8.97 
2.36 4.97 59.76 0.00 
−0.05 0.96 1.94 −2.81 
6.19 24.36 174.16 0.00 
7.71 6.30 38.04 0.00 
provided by the Transparency International (TI) which 
is deemed to be biased by the level of economic growth, 
religious beliefs and democratic institutions [22]. Follow-
ing Umar and Sun [48], we propose the use of General-
ized Method of Moments (GMM) estimators to control 
for the endogeneity evident in the current study and cap-
ture the efect of NPLs of the previous period on current 
values. More specifcally, the GMM model is using equa-
tion two: 
Results and discussion 
Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics of the variables 
used in this study. We report that on average 2.40% loans 
go bad every year with a standard deviation of 5.30. Te 
maximum value for NPL is 59.76, while the lowest value 
of 0 is also found in the sample. Average corruption score 
is 6.36 with a standard deviation of 2.44. Our sample con-
sists of countries in the two polar of the corruption index, 
i.e. very clean (0) and highly corrupt (10). Mean score of 
i ˜
Credit Riskit = ˜0 + °Credit Riski,t−1 + ˛Corruptionit + ° 2Controlsit + ˝it (2) 
i=1 
Here, Credit Riskit is measured using NPL to total gross 
loan ratio of bank i in time t. We also introduce a lagged 
dependent variable Credit Riski,t−1 which is is the lagged 
value of the NPL ratio; Controlsit represents the vector 
of macroeconomic variables; Corruptionit represents the 
explanatory variable and ˜it represents the error term. 
bank capital and reserve to the asset is 4.80 with a stand-
ard deviation of 5.58. Capital disclosure score is very poor 
with a mean score of 1.26. Te index score ranges from 0 
to 8. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth is promis-
ing with a mean score of 3.95 and a standard deviation 
of 6.02. Mean score of infation, public debt, remittance, 
trade openness and unemployment is 4.40, 2.36, -0.05, 
6.19 and 7.71 respectively. 





























































































































































































































































































































































































    
    
    
  
We perform panel least square regressions to deter-
mine the impact of corruption on credit risk. Credit risk 
of the banking sector is measured by the ratio of non-
performing loans to total gross loans (NPL). Several mac-
roeconomic factors are included in the regression model 
(see Eq.  1). Bank specifc variables are ignored in the 
economic model due to the global level of data used in 
this study. Te most important fndings of this study are 
that corruption has a positive association with the level 
of NPL. As can be seen in Table 6, the coefcient of cor-
ruption is positive and statistically signifcant at 1% level. 
Similar results are reported by Bougatef [15] on a sam-
ple of 22 emerging market economies over the period of 
2008–2012. Terefore, the current study provides validity 
and generalizability of past fndings with a sample of 178 
countries over a period of 2000 to 2017. Moreover, we 
have performed GMM regression to verify the impact of 
lagged values of NPL based on the proposition of Umar 
and Sun [48]. Table 6 represents the results obtained by 
using the one-step GMM estimation for the entire sam-
ple. Results indicate that an increase in previous years’ 
NPL results in a surge of NPL in the current year. Such 
Table 6 Regression scores 
Variables Panel OLS GMM 
Coefcient t-statistics Coefcient t-statistics 
Corruption 0.103 2.778 (***) 0.016 0.462 
NPLt−1 – – 0.843 74.461 (***) 
Capitalization 0.497 31.146 (***) 0.132 12.114 (***) 
Credit Disclosure 0.079 2.361 (**) −0.078 −3.787 (***) 
Index 
GDP Growth −0.068 −4.726 (***) −0.043 −4.827 (***) 
Infation −0.004 −0.880 −0.001 −0.171 
Public Debt −0.001 −0.216 −0.001 −0.370 
Remittance 0.015 1.213 −0.003 −0.004 
Trade Openness 0.004 2.511 (**) 0.001 0.628 
Unemployment 0.061 4.608 (***) 0.012 1.523 
Constant 0.095 0.340 0.126 0.462 
Adjusted r-square 0.289 0.746 
F-value 145.71 (***) 3013^ (***) 
Observations 3200 2844 
Hausamn 58.05 (***) – 
We have performed both fxed and random efect regression based on ˜
i 
i=1the model: NPLit = ˜i + ° 1Corruptionit + ° 2Controlsit + ˛it. We 
have also tried to capture the lag impact of NPL using the GMM model: ˜
k
Yit = ˜ + °Yi,t−1 + ˛ Corruptionit + ˝kCorruption
k
t + ˙it. Here, NPL is k=1 
the dependent variable and is measured by the ratio of non-performing loans 
to total gross loans. A detailed description of the measurement variable and 
control variables are provided in Table 4. Hausman test score indicates that the 
fxed efect model is appropriate for the study. Therefore, we report fxed efect 
regression scores in Table 6. 
^ represent j-statistic score with the related p value in the parenthesis. Asterisk 
** and *** represent signifcance level at 5 and 1% respectively. 
a result is in line with the fndings of Ghosh [27]. In both 
panel OLS and GMM regression models, capitaliza-
tion, credit disclosure index and GDP growth remains 
a signifcant predictor of NPL among the eight macro-
economic controls used in the economic model devel-
opment. Both models are signifcant at 1% level with an 
adjusted r-square value of 28.9 and 74.6% for panel OLS 
and GMM model, respectively.
Te nexus between corruption and development is not 
straightforward. Yakubu [50] argue that the spread of 
corruption varies across countries, resulting in an incon-
sistent impact of corruption on development between 
developing and developed countries. In Table 2, we group 
high and low corruption countries. We fnd that all devel-
oping countries fall within the group of high corruption 
countries while developed countries are grouped under 
low corruption countries. In high corruption countries, 
the weak form of institutions allows corruption to play a 
positive role in improving efciency [39]. Terefore, we 
have performed a sub-sample analysis by dividing our 
main sample into the group of high and low corruption 
countries to further explore the corruption and credit 
risk nexus across developing and developed countries.
Te median score of corruption is used as the basis 
to perform the sub-division of the sample. Low corrup-
tion counties include countries with a score below the 
median score (6.8) of the sample. Table  7 provides the 
sub-sample analysis. We fnd that the efect of corrup-
tion is positive for low corruption countries. Our fndings 
contradict with the results of Bougatef [15]. However, our 
results indicate that increase of corruption in an already 
corrupt environment could have a detrimental impact 
on the credit risk. Our results support Ali et al. [4] that 
corruption allows defaulters to get access to risk credit 
through bribing lending authorities. Following the strong 
form hypothesis [39], we report a positive relationship 
between corruption and NPL for low corruption coun-
tries. We confrm the robustness of our fndings by split-
ting the sample based on economic freedom. Chortareas 
et al. [18] fnd that a higher degree of fnancial freedom 
reduces the cost of fnancial institutions. We provide sup-
port for the “grease the wheel” hypothesis that corruption 
is benefcial with the presence of excessive regulatory 
pressure [23]. Such grease may allow borrowers to reduce 
costs resulting from redundant bureaucratic procedures, 
increasing bank lending.
We have performed two sets of robustness tests to
check the robustness of our results. First, we perform
a robust regression maintaining by introducing a new
measurement of corruption. We have used control of
corruption (CC) and data related to CC is obtained for
the World Governance Indicators (WGI) published by
the World Bank. The control of corruption measures











    
        
      








   
     
   





Table 7 Sub-sample analysis 
Variables High corruption countries Low corruption countries High economic freedom Low economic freedom 
Coefcient t-statistics Coefcient t-statistics Coefcient t-statistics Coefcient t-statistics 
Corruption −0.257 −2.252 (**) 0.278 4.353 (***) 0.175 3.37 (**) −0.022 −0.27 
Capitalization 0.553 24.885 (***) 0.398 17.237 (***) 0.356 14.14 (***) 0.582 27.94 (***) 
Credit Disclosure Index 0.064 0.942 0.119 3.052 (***) 0.138 3.23 (**) 0.049 0.92 
GDP Growth −0.039 −2.383 (**) −0.180 −5.706 (***) −0.155 −4.72 (***) −0.045 −2.74 (**) 
Infation 0.000 0.046 −0.053 −3.033 (***) −0.081 −2.78 (**) −0.001 −0.29 
Public Debt −0.003 −0.530 0.003 0.803 0.004 1.26 −0.016 −2.83 (**) 
Remittance −0.014 −0.880 0.016 0.756 0.053 2.60 (**) 0.002 0.11 
Trade Openness −0.001 −0.367 0.008 4.512 (***) 0.007 4.12 (***) 0.002 0.81 
Unemployment −0.015 −0.779 0.122 6.698 (***) 0.109 4.85 (***) 0.030 1.84 (**) 
Constant 3.200 2.861 (***) −1.843 −3.162 (***) −1.987 −3.35 (**) 0.485 0.60 
Adjusted r-square 0.330 0.282 0.238 0.347 
F-value 86.183 (***) 72.563 (***) 48.95 (***) 108.58 (***) 
Observations 1764 1436 1381 1819 
VIF 1.12 1.16 1.17 1.11 
Hausman Test 16.31 (*) 139.74 (***) 82.96 (***) 11.63 
Countries are divided into high and low corruption countries based on the median CI scores of 6.8. Countries with a corruption score above 6.8 are classifed as 
high corruption country while countries with corruption score below the median are classifed as low corruption country. We divide the sample into high and low 
economic freedom based on their median score derived from the Economic Freedom Index provided by the Heritage Foundation. Finally, we have performed a fxed 
efect regression based on the model described in Table 6. Asterisk *, ** and *** represent signifcance level at 10, 5 and 1% respectively 
the perception of the extent to which public power is versa. Table  8 provides the robustness test results
exercised for private gain. We perform the analysis for with alternative corruption measurement. Our results
both the full sample and sub-samples. This indicator indicate that the lack of control of corruption has
result ranges from − 2.5 to 2.5 A negative value indi- a negative impact on the NPL ratio for the full sam-
cates the absence of control of corruption and vice ple. Contrary to the subsample analysis, we report a
Table 8 Robustness test (alternative corruption measurement) 
Variables Full sample High corruption Low corruption 
Coefcient t-stat Coefcient t-stat Coefcient t-stat 
Control of Corruption −0.012 −3.551 (***) 0.007 0.770 −0.015 0.004 (***) 
Capitalization 0.494 30.992 (***) 0.562 25.596 (***) 0.409 0.023 (***) 
Credit Disclosure Index 0.076 2.281 (**) 0.072 1.056 0.118 0.039 (***) 
GDP Growth −0.065 −4.541 (***) −0.038 −2.282 −0.151 0.031 (***) 
Infation −0.003 −0.742 0.000 0.075 (**) −0.041 0.017 (**) 
Public Debt −0.001 −0.428 −0.006 −0.884 0.001 0.003 
Remittance 0.010 0.854 −0.002 −0.155 0.011 0.021 
Trade Openness 0.004 2.486 (**) −0.001 −0.334 0.007 0.002 (***) 
Unemployment 0.062 4.688 (***) −0.016 −0.806 0.137 0.018 (***) 
Constant 0.027 0.099 0.791 2.208 −0.297 0.532 
Adjusted r-square 0.290 0.328 0.281 
F-value 146.548 (***) 85.438 (***) 72.229 (***) 
Observations 3200 1764 1437 
˜
iWe have performed panel least square regression based on the model: NPLit = ˜i + ° 1Corruptionit + ° 2Controlsit + ˛it. However, the measure of corruption i=1 
is changed in this regression analysis. We have used control of corruption scores from the World Governance Indicator, published by World Bank in this model. The 
control of corruption scores ranges from approximately −2.5 to 2.5. A negative score indicates higher utilization of public power for private gain and vice versa. 
Hausman test score indicates that the fxed efect model is appropriate for the study. Therefore, we report fxed efect regression scores in Table 8. 
Asterisk ** and *** represent signifcance level at 5 and 1% respectively. 






















    
    
  
    
positive (negative) association between control of cor-
ruption and NPL for high corruption (low corruption)
countries. Therefore, we emphasize the importance of
the control of corruption which can play an effective
role in reducing the bad loan portfolio of the banking
system.
In the second phase of the robustness test, we have
made changes in the control variables. A new set of
control is introduced in the model which include five
measures of governance provided in the World Gov-
ernance Indicators (WGI), published by the World
Bank. While Beck et  al. [8] find little evidence that
supervisory agencies improve bank’s corporate gov-
ernance and reduce corruption in bank lending, we
followed Ben Saada [9] who reports that govern-
ance practices affect credit risk and bank stability as
well. Kamarudin et  al. [32] utilized similar measures
to study the efficiency of country governance on the
revenue and efficiency of Islamic and conventional
banks. Results reported in Table  9 prove the robust-
ness of the relationship between corruption and non-
performing loans. For both models with an additional
set of control variables, we conclude that corruption is
negatively related to NPL suggesting that corruption
adversely affects the loan portfolio of the banking sec-
tor. Therefore, we accept H1. 
Table 9 Robustness test 2 (change of control variables) 
Conclusion 
We explored the role of corruption on the loan qual-
ity of the banking sector. Te primary rationale for such 
an investigation is twofold. First, corruption is a com-
plex phenomenon and has been found to have mixed 
impact on institutional efciency concerning the “Grease 
or sand the wheel” hypothesis. Second, the association 
between corruption and credit risk has hardly been stud-
ied. Terefore, we have tried to provide global evidence 
on the impact of corruption on NPL. Our fndings reveal 
a robust relationship between corruption and NPL. We 
report a negative relationship between corruption and 
NPL which is in line with few studies conduct in this 
context. However, a subdivision of the full sample into 
high and low corruption countries provided interesting 
fndings and revealed the complex nature of corruption. 
We found corruption to have a negative association with 
NPL for high corruption countries and the opposite for 
low corruption countries. Such results are in line with 
the “Grease the wheel” hypothesis and indicate that cor-
ruption provides opportunities to speed up a sluggish 
bureaucratic administrative administration, concluding 
that corruption may positively contribute to growth and 
development with the compromise of the consequences 
of a defective bureaucracy and bad policies.
Our results have several implications for public pol-
icy. Regulators in high corruption countries should 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
Coefcient t-stat Coefcient t-stat 
Corruption – – 0.017 3.459 (***) 
Control of Corruption −1.388 −3.197 (***) – – 
GDP Growth −0.082 −4.925 (***) −0.075 −4.503 (***) 
Unemployment 0.060 3.941 0.064 4.191 (***) 
Infation −0.009 −1.697 (***) −0.007 −1.247 
Government Efectiveness 0.680 1.612 (***) −0.767 −3.939 (***) 
Political Stability 0.690 3.627 (***) 0.743 3.837 (***) 
Regulatory Quality 1.255 3.415 (***) 1.934 5.829 (***) 
Rule of Law −0.940 −2.572 (***) −1.612 −4.885 (***) 
Voice of Accountability 0.096 1.251 0.027 0.338 
Constant 3.503 9.163 (***) 3.503 9.163 
Adjusted r-square 0.041 0.042 
F-value 16.265 (***) 16.473 (***) 
Observations 3200 3200 
i ̃
We have performed panel least square regression based on the model: NPLit = ˜i + ° 1Corruptionit + ° 2Controlsit + ˛it. In model 1, the measure of corruption is 
i=1
the CPI score obtained from Transparency International. In model 2, we used the control of corruption as an explanatory variable. In both models, three control 
variable is retained from the original model which include GDP growth, unemployment and infation. In addition to these three control variables, fve control variables 
are introduced from World Governance Indicators (WGI) published by the World Bank. Hausman test score indicates that the fxed efect model is appropriate for the 
study. Therefore, we report fxed efect regression scores in Table 9. 
Asterisk ** and *** represent signifcance level at 5 and 1% respectively. 
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reconsider the cost and benefts of allowing corruption, 
in the form of bribery and tax evasion, to grease the eco-
nomic development of the country and emphasize on 
developing efective governance mechanisms to ensure 
sustainable growth of fnancial institutions. In the case 
of low corruption countries, corruption plays an adverse 
role in NPL and highlights the importance governance 
structure that could ensure the sound operation of the 
banking sector and stimulate economic growth. Tere-
fore, we propose that policymakers should focus on 
introducing reforms to enhance transparent reporting by 
enforcing mandatory audits. We recommend the adop-
tion of voluntary disclosure standards, such as the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) standards, to ensure proper 
disclosure of both fnancial and non-fnancial impact of 
corruption in the frm performance. Overall, this study 
recommends establishing efective mechanisms to fght 
against corruption with an inherent motivation toward 
ensuring efective credit screen mechanisms which has a 
wider implication toward the small and medium industry. 
Future research can be conducted on this issue to provide 
more insight into the impact of corruption on the growth 
of the SME sector from a global perspective. 
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